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ITALIAN POLITICS &
SOCIETY
THE REVIEW OF THE CONFERENCE
GROUP ON ITALIAN POLITICS AND
SOCIETY
No.64 Spring/Summer 2007General Editor: Book Reviews Editor:
Jonathan Hopkin Eleonora Pasotti
Department of Government Department of Politics
London School of Economics University of California
and Political Science Santa Cruz
Houghton St 1156 High St.
London WC2A 2AE Santa Cruz, CA 95064
Tel: +44 20 79556535 Tel: 1 831 459 2583
Fax: +44 20 79556352 Fax: 1 831 459 3125
J.R.Hopkin@lse.ac.uk Pasotti@ucsc.edu
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hopkin/ http://people.ucsc.edu/~pasotti/
Italian Politics and Society is published twice yearly, in the spring and fall. Proposed
contributions should be sent to Jonathan Hopkin at the above address.
1CONGRIPS OFFICERS:
President: Raffaella Nanetti, University of Illinois at Chicago
rnanetti@uic.edu
Vice-President Anthony Masi, McGill University
Anthony.Masi@mcgill.ca
Executive Secretary/Treasurer Dick Katz, Johns Hopkins University
rkatz1@jhu.edu
Program Chair Maurizio Carbone, University of Glasgow
m.carbone@socsci.gla.ac.uk
Webmaster Osvaldo Croci, Memorial University
ocroci@mun.ca
Executive Committee
Simona Piattoni University of Trento simona.piattoni@soc.unitn.it
Alan Zuckerman, Brown University Alan_Zuckerman@Brown.edu
Franklin Adler Macalester College adler@macalester.edu
Daniel Ziblatt Harvard University dziblatt@fas.harvard.edu
Fulvio Attina, (ex-officio) University of Catania attinaf@unict.it
Former Presidents
Norman Kogan (1975-77); Samuel Barnes (1977-79); Gianfranco Pasquino (1979-81);
Robert Putnam (1981-83); Joseph LaPalombara (1983-85); Sidney Tarrow (1985-87);
Peter Lange (1989-91); Raphael Zariski (1991-93); Steve Hellman (1993-95); Alberta
Sbragia (1995-97); Miriam Golden (1997-99); Richard Katz (1999-2001); Filippo Sabetti
(2001-03); Carol Mershon (2003-05).
2CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE
News and Announcements 4
Forthcoming Events and Publications 7
Articles:
‘How Christian Democratic is the Italian Welfare State?’ 11
Julia Lynch
‘Prima della Lega: i partiti italiani e le regioni a statuto speciale, 22
in costituente’
Attilio Tempestini
Debate:
‘La forma organizzativa del Partito Democratico’ 32
Salvatore Vassallo
Book Essay and Reviews 43
Roberto Chiarini, 25 Aprile: La competizione politica sulla memoria, reviewed 43
by Paola Cesarini
Donatella della Porta, Comitati di Cittadini e Democrazia Urbana, reviewed 45
by Giovanni Allegretti
Maurizio Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare, reviewed by Todor Enev 47
Maurice Finocchiaro, Retrying Galileo: 1633-1992, reviewed by Darren Hynes 49
Giancarlo Galli, Poteri deboli. La nuova mappa del capitalismo nell’Italia 52
in declino, reviewed by Giorgio Giraudi
Antonio La Spina, Mafia, Legalità Debole e Sviluppo del Mezzogiorno, 54
reviewed by Francesca Longo
Mary Wood, Italian Cinema, reviewed by Jason Pine 56
3NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS
LAUREA HONORIS CAUSA IN SCIENZE DELLA POLITICA AL PROF. JEAN
BLONDEL, UNIVERSITÀ DI MACERATA, 15 GIUGNO 2007
L'Università di Macerata conferirà a Jean Blondel, già Professore dell'Università di Essex
e dell'Istituto Universitario Europeo, e membro della Royal Swedish Academy of
Sciences e dell'American Academy of Sciences, eminente ricercatore e maestro rigoroso,
la laurea honoris causa in Scienze della Politica per il contributo di grande rilievo e di
alto profilo innovativo offerto agli studi sulle istituzioni di governo, sui sistemi di partito,
sui rapporti tra scienza politica e costituzionalismo e, più in generale, sulla politica
comparata.
La cerimonia si terrà il 15 giugno 2007 alle ore 10.30 nell'Aula Magna dell'Università.
Interverranno il Magnifico Rettore dell'Università di Macerata, prof. Roberto Sani, il
preside della Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, prof. Vitantonio Gioia, e il prof. Luca
Lanzalaco esporrà la laudatio del candidato. Dopo la proclamazione del laureato, e la
consegna del diploma honoris causa e della medaglia dell'Università, il prof. Jean
Blondel terrà la sua lectio magistralis sul tema 'L'Unione Europea e la sfida
dell'allargamento ad Est'.
ROME PRIZE 2008
The American Academy in Rome invites applications for the Rome Prize competition.
One of the leading overseas centers for independent study and advanced research in the
arts and the humanities, the Academy offers up to thirty fellowships for periods ranging
from six months to two years. Rome Prize winners reside at the Academy's eleven-acre
center in Rome and receive room and board, a study or studio, and a stipend. Stipends
for six-month fellowships are $11,000 and stipends for eleven-month fellowships are
$22,000.
Fellowships are awarded in the following related fields: Literature; Musical
Composition; Visual Arts; Ancient Studies; Medieval Studies; Renaissance and Early
Modern Studies; and Modern Italian Studies
The competition deadline is 1st November 2007.
For further information or to download guidelines and application forms, visit the
Academy's website at http://www.aarome.org/ or contact the American Academy in
Rome, 7 East 60 Street, New York, NY10022-1001, Attn. Programs. T: (212) 751-7200,
ext. 47; F: (212) 751-7220; E: info@aarome.org. Please state specific field of interest
when requesting information.
4RESEARCH FELLOWSHIPS
Il Dipartimento di Studi Sociali e Politici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano
annuncia il bando di concorso per un assegno di ricerca della durata di un anno
nell'ambito di un Programma di Ricerca di Interesse Nazionale (PRIN) co-finanziato dal
Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca e coordinato dal dott. Giovanni Carbone. Il
vincitore dell'assegno collaborerà allo svolgimento di una ricerca quantitativa sulle
conseguenze politiche, economiche e sociali dei processi di democratizzazione. Ai
candidati è richiesta la padronanza dell'uso dei metodi quantitativi per le scienze sociali
(scienza politica, economia o sociologia) e i relativi strumenti informatici (SPSS, Stata,
ecc.). Il bando, del quale si invita a rendere diffusamente nota l'esistenza e al quale si
sollecita a fare domanda, verrà pubblicato tra maggio e giugno 2007 sul sito
www.unimi.it/ricerca/assegni_ricerca. Per ulteriori informazioni, si invita a contattare il
dott. Giovanni Carbone ( g.carbone@unimi.it).
COLLABORAZIONI E BORSE DI STUDIO: RIVISTA DI GEOPOLITICA E
RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI ‘EQUILIBRI.NET’
La Rivista di Geopolitica e Relazioni Internazionali ‘Equilibri.net’ (www.equilibri.net) è
alla ricerca di studenti, laureandi, laureati e dottorandi che volessero collaborare.
Equilibri.net è una rivista di Geopolitica e Relazioni Internazionali che pubblica ogni
anno oltre 1200 analisi paese in tre lingue (italiano, spagnolo ed inglese) secondo una
metodologia di ricerca ed analisi rigorosa e attenta. La rivista organizza anche corsi per
Analista in Relazioni Internazionali presso la SIOI, l'ASERI (Università Cattolica di
Milano) e privatamente.
Per gli studenti che fossero interessati ai nostri corsi di Analista in Relazioni
Internazionali le segnaliamo che sono disponibili 6 borse di studio a totale copertura
del corso. Per qualsiasi informazione è possibile consultare la nostra pagina:
http://www.equilibri.net/pagine/formazione o telefonare allo 028360642 o ancora
scrivere a formazione@equilibri.net.
RIVISTA ITALIAN DI POLITICHE PUBBLICHE – PREMIO GIOVANI
STUDIOSI
La Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche promuove un concorso per il migliore
articolo nel campo dell’analisi delle politiche pubbliche e degli studi sulle pubbliche
amministrazione scritto da giovani studiosi al di sotto dei 35 anni.
I candidati dovranno inviare un saggio di non oltre 80.000 caratteri su un tema
riguardante i diversi settori di politica pubblica o le caratteristiche di funzionamento e i
principali tentativi di riforma delle pubbliche amministrazioni nelle loro diverse
articolazioni settoriali e territoriali. Gli articoli potranno basarsi su singoli casi di studio
oppure adottare una prospettiva di tipo comparato. Particolare attenzione verrà dedicata
ai contributi basati su ricerche empiriche e sulla presentazione di dati originali. I saggi
5non devono essere già stati pubblicati in altre riviste, nemmeno parzialmente, né lo
potranno essere se dichiarati vincitori.
Il vincitore vedrà pubblicato il proprio lavoro sulla «RIPP» nel corso del 2008, si
aggiudicherà un buono del valore di 500 Euro per l’acquisto di libri della casa editrice Il
Mulino e riceverà gratuitamente un abbonamento annuale alla Rivista.
Il comitato di redazione della Rivista è responsabile della valutazione dei saggi. Esso
terrà conto del grado di originalità e innovatività del tema prescelto, del rigore e
dell’appropriatezza dell’impianto metodologico e della solidità della prospettiva teorica
di riferimento.
Gli articoli dovranno essere spediti entro il 30 settembre 2007 per posta elettronica
all’indirizzo e-mail della redazione (ripp@spbo.unibo.it) riportando la dicitura “Premio
Ripp - Giovani Studiosi”. La comunicazione del vincitore verrà resa nota entro il 31
Dicembre 2007. I criteri redazionali e il formato da utilizzare possono essere consultati
sul sito della rivista (www.mulino.it/edizioni/riviste ).
La direzione: Giorgio Freddi, Elisabetta Gualmini
Il comitato di redazione: Brunetta Baldi (caporedattore), Cristina Maltoni (segretaria di
redazione), Massimo Baldini, Giliberto Capano, Daniela Giannetti, Marco Giuliani, Luca
Lanzalaco, Antonio La Spina, Rodolfo Lewanski, Renata Lizzi, Franca Maino,
Emmanuele Pavolini, Patrizia Pederzoli, Giuseppe Sciortino, Federico Toth, Salvatore
Vassallo, Nereo Zamaro.
6FORTHCOMING EVENTS AND PUBLICATIONS
A NAPOLI DAL 12 AL 15 LUGLIO LA SUMMER SCHOOL DELLA
FONDAZIONE MEZZOGIORNO EUROPA
Il bando lanciato il 1 giugno vede già un boom di domande. Le richieste potranno essere
presentate entro il 25 giugno
Dopo il successo riscosso lo scorso dicembre in occasione della prima Winter School,
prenderà il via il 12 luglio la Scuola estiva di formazione politica “Cittadini, Politica,
Istituzioni” organizzata dalla Fondazione Mezzogiorno Europa
(www.mezzogiornoeuropa.it), il think tank presieduto da Andrea Geremicca che
raccoglie l'eredità politico culturale e il bagaglio di esperienze e competenze del "Centro
Mezzogiorno Europa", fondato nel 1999 dal Presidente della Repubblica Giorgio
Napolitano.
La Scuola, che si concluderà il 15 Luglio e si svolgerà a Napoli nelle sale della Stazione
Marittima, è rivolta a studenti universitari, dirigenti politici e amministratori per
un’esperienza di analisi e formazione su temi di stringente attualità quali l’attuale crisi
politica italiana, il rapporto fra politica e cultura, Europa e diritti di cittadinanza ed i
nuovi modelli di partecipazione.
A confrontarsi con i cento partecipanti, che saranno selezionati attraverso il bando
pubblico che si chiuderà il 25 giugno, esponenti del Governo, deputati europei, docenti
universitari ed esponenti del mondo della cultura.
Il bando è scaricabile da: http://www.mezzogiornoeuropa.it/?d=formazione, le
iscrizioni alla scuola invece si potranno fare esclusivamente compilando il modulo a
questo link: www.mezzogiornoeuropa.it/?d=modulo.
Per ulteriori informazioni : formazione@mezzogiornoeuropa.it .
SOCIETA ITALIANA DI SCIENZA POLITICA (SISP): XXI CONGRESSO SISP,
CATANIA 20-22 SETTEMBRE 2007
I programmi dei panels sono già disponibili in rete. Basta cliccare sul titolo di ciascun
panel alla pagina web del Congresso SISP (http://www.ssc.unict.it/sisp2007/) per
conoscere chairs, discussants e paper-givers. Gli abstracts dei papers saranno on-
line nella paper-room (http://www.sisp.it/sisp_convegnoannuale_paperroom.asp).
I partecipanti non soci SISP sono tenuti a pagare un costo di iscrizione al Congresso di
25 euro (non-strutturati) o 50 euro (strutturati). I responsabili di panels sono invitati a
darne comunicazione.
7INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ‘WOMEN’S FILMMAKING IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN’, WELLESLEY COLLEGE
The Department of Italian Studies of Wellesley College, Massachusetts, USA hosts an
International Symposium on ‘Visions of Struggle: Women's Filmmaking in the
Mediterranean’, on November 2-3, 2007.
This two-day long symposium illustrates the hybrid expressions of modernity as
manifested in the ways of being a woman in struggle in the Mediterranean area, paying
special attention to women’s cinema as a form of counter-cinema and re-interpretation of
women’s shifting roles.Organized around socio-political themes, invited speakers
examine films and documentaries denouncing and protesting against violence and abuse,
exposing hypocrisies, and addressing the consequences of cultural conflicts and changes
for women’s lives in Mediterranean countries today. Topics include: family relationships
and gender roles; domestic violence and sexual abuse; mental health and psychological
disorders; traditions, taboos, and prejudices versus rebellion and awareness; human
rights/women’s rights and social/cultural injustice; women victims/collaborators in
organized crime; war crimes against women; political militancy and resistance.
Contact: Flavia Laviosa, flaviosa@wellesley.edu
GIANGIACOMO FELTRINELLI FOUNDATION, CORTONA COLLOQUIUM
2007: WAR, LAW AND GLOBAL ORDER
The Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, in cooperation with the University of Florence
and the Jura Gentium Center, invites doctoral candidates and young PhD recipients or
researchers to submit proposals for participation at the Cortona Colloquium 2007 - War,
Law and Global Order, to be held 19-20 October 2007 in Cortona, Italy. This year's
edition of the Foundation's international conference will feature Antonio Cassese
(University of Florence) as its keynote speaker, and will be coordinated by Danilo Zolo
(University of Florence).
The Colloquium will be focused around, but not limited to, the following sub-themes:
The "New Wars" and the National and International Protection of Human Rights; The
Problem of Peace and the Function of International Criminal Justice; How to Define the
Notion of "War of Aggression"?; Terrorism and International Law; The Palestinian
Question as the Epicenter of the Wars in the Middle East, and the Impotence of the
International Community. Organizers welcome proposals from a variety of fields and
disciplines, including international relations, international law, history and philosophy of
international law, theory of human rights, history of the Middle East, political theory of
globalization, political philosophy, political science and philosophy of law.
The working languages of the Colloquium will be English and Italian. Simultaneous
translation will be available.
Contact: Sara Benjamin at international@fondazionefeltrinelli.it
8‘LA SOSTENIBILITÀ DELLA DEMOCRAZIA NEL XXI SECOLO’
Si annuncia un ‘Corso di alta formazione’ su ‘La sostenibilità della democrazia nel XXI
secolo’ organizzato dal Consorzio interuniversitario Nova Universitas che si svolgerà a
Milano, presso il Grand Hotel Villa Torretta (Via Milanese, 3) nei giorni 27-28
settembre, 22-23 novembre e 13-14 dicembre 2007.
Per qualsiasi informazione è possibile rivolgersi al sito del consorzio interuniversitario
Nova Universitas, www.novauniversitas.it oppure i seguenti indirizzi mail
eriklongo@gmail.com, info@novauniversitas.it, oppure tramite telefono al numero
051/5287474.
MASTER PROGRAMME POLITICS IN EUROPE, UNIVERSITY OF SIENA:
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND SUPRANATIONAL ARENAS
The courses offered will cover both a "Comparative politics" and a "European politics"
perspective. The first approach focuses on similarities and differences among national
political systems, while the second one on European institutions and decision-making
processes. Activities such as meetings with national and international officers and policy
makers, and visits to EU institutions, are also provided. A number of internships and
stages at European and Italian institutions, during and at the end of the teaching
programme, will be available. A study visit to the European and international institutions
in Brussels is regularly organized at the end of the courses. The programme is entirely
offered in English.
Applications should normally be received by July 30th. The fee is set in € 3.500. Info:
www.gips.unisi.it/gradschool. Enquiries: Silvina Cabrera (tel. +39 0577 235311; mail:
cabrera@unisi.it ).
APSA 2007 ANNUAL MEETING, CHICAGO, 30 AUGUST-2 SEPTEMBER
CONGRIPS is once again organizing a sponsored panel at the forthcoming APSA annual
meeting, on the theme ‘Italian Politics After the Crisis’. Details of the panel are as
follows:
Date and Time: Thursday, Aug 30, 2:00 PM
Chair: Maurizio Carbone, m.carbone@socsci.gla.ac.uk, University of Glasgow
Papers:
‘Italian Politics and the European Union: A Tale of Two Research Designs’
Claudio M. Radaelli University of Exeter, c.radaelli@exeter.ac.uk
9‘Industrial Relations and the Welfare State in Italy: Assessing the Transformative
Potential of a Negotiated Transition’
Martin J. Rhodes, University of Denver, martin.rhodes@iue.it
‘A Long Quest in Vain: Institutional Reforms’
Martin J. Bull, University of Salford, m.j.bull@salford.ac.uk
‘Conflicts of Interest and Media Pluralism in Italian Broadcasting’
Matthew Hibberd, University of Stirling, m.j.hibberd@stir.ac.uk
Discussant: Sidney Tarrow, Cornell University, sgt2@cornell.edu
10How Christian Democratic is the Italian Welfare State?*
Julia Lynch
University of Pennsylvania
phenomenon influences policy outcomes:
Introduction social Catholic ideology as carried by
political parties and other social actors
Is the welfare state in Italy, a (Esping-Andersen 1998, Kersbergen 1995);
quintessentially Christian democratic polity, and the “politics of mediation” (Becker and
a "Christian democratic welfare state"? The Kersbergen 1988, Kersbergen 1995), a
Italian welfare state has most, if not all, of political strategy characteristic of centrist
the hallmarks of what is often referred to in parties based on cross-class, religiously-
the comparative welfare state literature as a oriented social coalitions. I shall argue in
Christian democratic welfare state (hereafter this article, however, that neither of these
CDWS): contributory social insurance mechanisms fully explain the development
programs linked to occupation that in Italy of policy features commonly
reproduce status differentials, a regarded as characteristic of a Christian
predominance of transfers over services, low democratic welfare state.
female force participation and low A reconstruction of the history of
employment rates among others. The key Italy’s welfare state offers surprisingly little
explanation in the comparative literature for evidence for the impact of religious
the emergence of these features in a number doctrines on the shape of social policies.
of countries has been Christian democratic The role of the Church as a pressure group
party strength, usually measured as promoting particular policies was tightly
government participation of Christian circumscribed, with the possible exception
democratic parties. In Italy both the of education. Policy drift (Hacker 2005),
institutional features and the political rather than demand emanating from a
strength of Democrazia Cristiana (DC) are religiously-inspired society, drives many of
undeniably present, lending plausibility to the key policy features that others have
the argument that Christian Democracy built interpreted as evidence of a Christian
the Italian welfare state. democratic imprint. But it was above all the
Yet this view of the Italian welfare DC’s extreme reliance on clientelism that
state as organically related to the political led to the development of highly
strength of a Christian democratic party fragmented, status-differentiated, and
does not concern itself adequately with the gendered policies in the Italian welfare state.
mechanisms by which Christian democracy This article’s main purpose, then, is
as a political phenomenon becomes to illustrate the mechanisms through which
translated into welfare state structures. Christian democracy has affected the Italian
Indeed, it tells us little about how Christian welfare state. The importance of the
democratic parties may have created presence of a religious cleavage in politics is
homologous welfare states distinct from the beyond question. But how does this
welfare states constructed in polities cleavage matter? How does it become
dominated by social democratic or Liberal transformed into social policies?
parties. Other scholars have identified two
main pathways through which Christian * Excerpted from a paper prepared for Religion, Class
Coalitions, and Welfare State Regimes, Ed. Kees van
democracy as a social and political Kersbergen and Philip Manow, forthcoming.
11The Christian democratic isomorphism of Portugal2. At the same time, Italian civil
the Italian welfare state law recognizes an extended network of
obligation to provide cash support for family
Italy is often described in the comparative members.
welfare state literature as a Christian "Weak state control" over the
democratic welfare state, following on the financing and implementation of social
seminal contributions of Esping-Andersen policies has also been a hallmark of the
(1990 and 1999) and Kersbergen (1995). At Italian welfare state. Most social policies in
the level of policy, a CDWS is characterized Italy, even means-tested social assistance
by occupational social insurance programs benefits, are financed via payroll
that reproduce status differentials; few deductions, rather than through general
publicly provided services, particularly for revenues or specially earmarked taxes. In
families; a male-breadwinner bias in both shifting the burden of financing to the social
tax and transfer systems; and a tendency to partners, the Italian state also effectively
devolve authority over delivery and relieved itself of the duty to collect
implementation of social policy to non-state payments, and employees have complained
actors. Italy’s welfare state meets many of frequently over the years that evasion of
these criteria. It is occupationalist: social social payments by employers is
insurance programs like pensions, widespread. The administration of social
unemployment benefits, and family benefits in Italy is likewise subject to weak
allowances do not provide uniform benefits state control. Most old-age and disability
for all citizens, or even all workers. Instead, pensions, family allowances, and some
numerous different programs addressing the types of unemployment benefits are
same basic risk (eg. old age, unemployment) administered by the national social security
draw from distinct, although rarely administration (INPS), which is governed on
hypothecated, funds. The result is a a tripartite basis with the social partners
"jungle" of highly differentiated provisions enjoying a strong majority. Much
(Gorrieri 1972) that preserve the privileged institutional care for children, the disabled
positions of some sectors and grades of and the elderly is operated by non-state
workers, and exclude others entirely. The actors. From the 1960s through the early
system works to preserve status differentials 1990s, the remaining social assistance
and validate class and occupation functions of the welfare state were carried
hierarchies. out by a public administration that was
The Italian welfare state is also thoroughly colonized by political parties
transfer-heavy, spending only 23 per cent of that should themselves be considered
its total social budget, including health care, subsidiary organizations.
on services (as compared to 42 per cent in The Italian social insurance system
Sweden and 36 per cent in the UK).1 As a seems to conform to social Catholic
result, families are responsible for providing doctrines of organic hierarchy and
or purchasing much care for children, the subsidiarity. The Italian pension system –
disabled, and the elderly. Even in the realm more than 120 separate public pension funds
of cash transfers, familial obligations are for different sectors and categories of
only weakly subsidized: throughout the workers at its peak (Castellino 1976) -- is an
1980s and 1990s, spending on cash benefits unusually fragmented occupationalist
and services for families with children per system, and has been interpreted as a
child under age 14 was lower in Italy than reflection of the social Catholic emphasis on
anywhere else in Europe outside Spain and status preservation. The pension-heavy mix
of welfare state spending in general is also
2
Data from OECD 2003. Average of yearly
1
1999 data from Abramovici 2002. amounts from 1985 through 1998.
12notable. Italy spends a higher proportion of preserved because of strong support from
its social policy resources on the elderly Catholic political actors and/or the Church.
(even adjusting for the demographic makeup As we shall see, however, successive
of the population) than almost any other opportunities for reform in the direction of
OECD country (Lynch 2001). Relatively universalism were blocked not solely by the
generous public pensions coexist with political power of social Catholic ideologies,
meager child allowances and unemployment but also, and more actively, by other forces.
benefits, and almost non-existent family Occupational differentiation in the
services and active labor market programs. Italian pension system dates back to the
This policy mix, which appears to fit nicely earliest public pension legislation. The first
with the social Catholic doctrine of public pension provisions in Italy, which
subsidiarity, allocates large cash transfers to took Bismarck's programs in Germany as a
older (usually male) family heads for further direct model, were for public employees
redistribution. In return, it requires familial only. In 1898 the first state-supported
(often female) provision of both financial pension scheme for employees in the private
and non-financial assistance to needy sector was legislated, but inscription was
members. voluntary. This reflected to a certain degree
It should be noted, and I have social Catholic doctrine as expressed in the
argued elsewhere (Lynch 2006), that 1891 papal encyclical Rerum Novarum,
Catholic social doctrine could be interpreted which preferred joint worker-owner
in such a way as to legitimate other policy schemes to obligatory state-run social
options as well, including generous family insurance (Ferrera 1993, 214-5).
allowances. Futhermore, policy features Nevertheless, Church and Christian
central to the CDWS are present in most democratic influences do not seem to have
continental European states, even where been the most important contributors to the
they trace their roots to ideological and 1898 law's emphasis on occupational social
political movements distinct from Christian provisions. Politicians of the day were
democracy . So in order to understand the strongly influenced by the desire to
sources of the Italian welfare state’s “legitimate the Liberal state in the eyes of
particular mix of policies, it is necessary to the working classes” (Gustapane 1989, 57),
look beyond their prima facie compatibility and saw socialismo della cattedra along
with social Catholic ideologies, and attend Bismarckian lines as the means to this end.
closely to the mechanisms through which And while the Church had an interest in
Christian democracy as a political promoting mutualism at the expense of
movement has influenced their formation. comprehensive state-run insurance
programs, so too did non-religious actors,
The secular roots of stratification and such as the small and medium landowners in
occupational fragmentation the South who did not want to pay insurance
contributions for their agricultural laborers.
The Italian social security system’s basic Italy’s early pension legislation, then,
occupational organizational structure dates reflected the étatist impulse of the Liberal
from the late nineteenth and early twentieth period, and served the political ends of both
century, a period in which Catholics were the Liberal politicians who controlled the
excluded by papal order from participation state policy apparatus and Catholic actors
in government and politics. The case for who, however, did not themselves have any
strong Christian democratic influence in direct way of influencing policy outcomes.3
constructing the early policies of the Italian
welfare state in Italy therefore appears weak 3
on the face of it. It could, of course, be Ferrera (1993) takes a more structural view,
possible that the Italian welfare state’s arguing that the occupational fragmentation of
the Italian social insurance system results from
original occupationalist structure was only longstanding features of the Italian political
13In the aftermath of the First World support for the regime (e.g. to journalists),
War, the social question re-emerged with and sacrificing those who could not fight
particular intensity, and by 1919 obligatory back. So the original occupationalist design
pensions for blue-collar employees came of the Italian social insurance system was
into law. Pensions applied only to blue- inspired primarily by étatist principles,
collar workers with incomes less than 800 rather than social Catholic ones, and was
Lire per month, and the organization of implemented under a regime in which
social insurance programs remained Catholics and the Church were explicitly
fragmented along occupational lines. The excluded from policy-making. Successive
1919 law introduced relatively modest attempts to broaden, harmonize, and
changes, in part because employers opposed universalize pension coverage failed, but
the maximalist reforms envisioned by never because of opposition from Christian
Liberal Prime Minister Nitti. Agricultural democratic forces. Indeed the occupational
employers in particular argued that they fragmentation of the Italian pension system
could not afford obligatory pension continued to increase well through the
insurance and that therefore the only 1980s. As we shall see, however,
possible direction of reforms was an occupational fragmentation persisted not
extension of voluntary insurance (Sepe because of social Catholic respect for
1999, 100). The failure of Nitti’s reform hierarchy and status differentials, but
agenda has been attributed mostly to because of the particular style of political
opposition from employers (Cherubini 1977: competition that the DC engaged in for
237). But other political forces also failed much of the post-War period.
to support a radical reorganization of the
system along universalistic lines. Divisions The laissez-faire roots of passive social
in the socialist movement meant that assistance measures
working-class organs no longer spoke with
one voice in favor of social reformism, and, Before turning to the development of the
despite increasing discussion of a Italian welfare state after WWII, though, we
universalistic option in the years leading up must consider for a moment the pre-War
to 1919 (Ferrera 1993, 225), many Liberals roots of social assistance, as well as those of
continued to favor simply extending the old the social insurance programs we have
model of state-subsidized occupational already examined. The terrain of social
insurance (Sepe 1999, 158). A Christian assistance, taken together with the explosive
democratic voice was then not a decisive growth of occupationalist social insurance
contributor to the already overdetermined programs, has important implications for the
outcome of this debate. eventual familialist orientation of the
The onset of the extreme welfare state in the contemporary period.
occupational fragmentation that The Italian welfare state’s emphasis on
characterizes the Italian social insurance pensions at the expense of other forms of
system today dates to the Fascist period. social spending marks it as a passive,
Cherubini (1977, 270) attributes the growth familialist, male-breadwinner centered
of special privileges and deficiencies for welfare regime. Locating the origins of this
different sectors to the Fascist politics of policy mix -- either in social Catholic
playing groups off of one another, offering doctrines of subsidiarity, or in some other
concessions where necessary to garner set of causes -- is then crucial for
understanding the mechanisms through
which Christian democracy has influenced
economy: a highly segmented economy, and a the Italian welfare state.
culturally fragmented and ideologically The Italian welfare state clearly
polarized polity. Both make risk-pooling and the shows signs of Church influence in the
development of solidarity difficult (see also
Baldwin 1990). .
prevalence of non-state, often Church-run,
14social service provision, and in the under- reported revenues of private charitable
development of social assistance more institutions in 1880 were nearly equal to the
generally. The Church in Italy had a near total tax take of the Italian state (Quine
monopoly on charity and institutional care 2002, 50). In the Liberal period, then, the
in the late nineteenth century, and staunchly Church's role in perpetuating its own
defended its material and spiritual interests dominance of the social assistance sector
in the social assistance sector. Yet Liberal- was indirect, operating mainly as a default
era politicians overcame the Church's option pursued only because of Liberal
objections and, in several key areas, voted politicians' own preference for limited
for legislation that was important to their central government involvement.
goals of “modernizing” society and
achieving a separation of civil and Clientelism and the maintenance of
ecclesiastical authority. The Italian state did occupationalism after World War II
attempt to assert control over private
charitable institutions, by transforming An opportunity for radical revision of pre-
Christian charity into a theoretically more existing social insurance and social
rational, discretionary, and efficient "legal assistance programs occurred in Italy after
charity" (caritá legale). However, this World War II. Wartime conditions had
attempt was half-hearted. Legislation in the aggravated social problems, and insurance
pre-World War I period made municipal- programs had been bankrupted because of
and provincial-level administrators runaway inflation and wartime destruction
responsible for regulating and transforming of property. Italy’s reform-minded
religious charities into public entities, but Communist Party (PCI), the second-largest
these administrators were endowed with party after the DC, strongly advocated
neither the financial resources nor the replacing the old system of occupational
administrative capacities necessary to social insurance with a universal
effectively intrude upon traditional citizenship-based welfare state. Two
practices. Decentralization and delegation nonpartisan Commissions, in 1947 and
of administrative control over social 1963, recommended that the pension system
assistance was "a means for the nation's be overhauled, occupational distinctions
leaders to offload the financial and minimized, and coverage eventually
bureaucratic responsibilities for monitoring extended to the self-employed
opere pie onto officials in the localities" (Commissione d'Aragona 1948, CNEL
(Quine 2002, 44; see also Fargion 1997, 75). 1963). But beginning in the 1950s the
Even once the Italian state's fiscal existing occupational pension system was
capacity improved in the last decade of the gradually extended, under DC tutelage, to
nineteenth century and the first of the new categories of beneficiaries (small
twentieth, policy-makers remained farmers, fishermen, artisans, shopkeepers,
unwilling to assume for the central state the housewives, etc.), each with its own
burden of providing social assistance to the separate scheme.
masses. The clientelist political dynamics In the realm of social assistance,
of legislative trasformismo also played a politics continued to limit the development
role in the continuing underdevelopment of of public social services well into the
national-level policies. Locally constituted Republican period (Fargion 1997). The post-
public boards consolidated the finances of war Constitution for the first time granted
smaller charities and governed the operation citizens a right to social assistance,
of even the larger institutions. These boards redefining charity as a duty of the state. But
were an important electoral resource for a administrative competence was vested in the
system that prized the manufacture of regions and municipalities, and the DC’s
electoral majorities at the prefectural level fears that more autonomous regional
(Quine 2002, 58), especially given that the governments would lead to electoral gains
15for the PCI meant that provisions giving impossibility of adequately assessing and
regions real powers remained dead-letter collecting pension contributions, especially
entities until the 1970s. DC policies and among the self-employed, as reasons to
practices limited the competencies of state continue to provide pension benefits on an
institutions, at the local and regional level as occupational basis (Commissione d'Aragona
well as the national level, and the state’s 1948, CNEL 1963a and 1963b). Labor
inaction in turn allowed the Church to leaders, although they professed support for
maintain its traditional role in the social the idea of universal coverage, feared that
service sector (Fargion 1997, 89). any universalization of the system would be
In the realm of social insurance, the paid for out of increased payroll taxes on
basic configuration of early post-War employees, and so repeatedly called for
welfare state politics pitted a universalizing fiscal reform as a prerequisite to pension
Left against an emergent DC with little reform. The DC’s unfunded extension of the
interest in changing the status quo. The Left pension system to new clienteles in the
in Italy (the PCI, the Socialist PSI, and a 1950s and 1960s, though, worked to erode
majority of the union movement) favored labor movement support for
universalizing the pension system for universalization.
ideological reasons related to the By the early 1960s, Italy’s pension
development of universal citizenship in the system was categorized by two types of
new Italian republic. The DC, however, if it funds: those running a surplus, primarily the
favored maintaining the occupational status FPLD (Fondo pensioni lavoratori
quo, did not do so for parallel reasons of dipendenti, the main industrial employees’
social Catholic ideology, but rather in order fund) and the special funds for small groups
to pursue clientelist distribution of public like journalists; and those running large
goods and services (state jobs, tax relief, deficits, primarily the funds for agricultural
preferential pension treatment) to blocs of workers, artisans and shop-keepers. The
reliable supporters. latter funds had been set up in the late 1950s
In the early post-war period the self- and early 1960s by DC governments in
employed and rural Southerners were order to benefit clienteles that were
cherished above all (LaPalombara 1964). particularly important to the DC. These
Preference voting, which allowed electors to funds ran large deficits because, in service
cast a ballot for a particular candidate from a to the clientelistic goals of the reforms,
party’s list and hence allowed the party to contribution rates were low and benefits
determine the power and privilege of made available to people with very limited
discrete factions (correnti) within the contributory histories. While the state
national party apparatus, was particularly subsidized these pensions out of general
widespread in the South. Once the DC had revenues to some degree, in large part it was
for several decades been in a position to the employees’ funds that were asked to
hand out public jobs as patronage, public make up for shortfalls in a form of
sector and parastatal employees became “enforced solidarity” (Ferrera 1993, 262).
even more crucial sources of support. The By the late 1960s, both Confindustria (the
priority for pension system policy was thus main employers' confederation) and the
to generate maximum “consensus” by unions were complaining about the
securing maximum benefits for rather increased payroll taxes that had become
narrowly defined occupational and sectoral necessary to support this burden, and union
groups. support for universalizing the pension
The main obstacle in Italy to system waned.
implementing the universalistic pension The one piece of universalism in the
proposals of the early post-War period was Italian pension system was the Social
the tax system. The reports of the 1947 and Pension, which originated in tripartite
1963 reform commissions both cite the accords in 1964 and provided a pension of
16last resort to low-income elderly Italians. occupational fragmentation of the pension
But the way that the Social Pension was system, because fragmented occupational
implemented between 1965 and 1970 provisions provided clientelist politicians
ultimately undermined the Left’s support for with important resources. Italy’s
a universal pension system. The 1964 proliferation of pension provisions, each
agreement established that Social Pension with its own benefit formula, contribution
benefits should be financed out of state rate, degree of state subsidy, rules governing
revenues deposited in a new Social Fund. It retirement age, years of service required to
appeared that the first steps towards a truly enter into the plan, etc., indicate how
universal pension benefit had been taken. thoroughly the pension system has been
By 1968, however, both Confindustria and used as a way to attract support from
the labor unions had lodged complaints that particular groups in the population.
state contributions to the Social Fund were Christian Democratic politicians advocated
inadequate to cover its costs, and the fund extending pension benefits to the self-
was instead drawing resources from the employed on very generous terms during the
FPLD. It had become clear by this point 1950s and 1960s as part of a strategy to
that Social Pensions would have to be paid purchase loyalty from these groups. During
out of employees’ pockets if they were to be the post-war period, state employees,
paid at all, and union support for further however, were the most important targets of
universalization of the pension system (as clientelist pension legislation, for obvious
well as for upgrading the level of the Social reasons. As the staff of public and quasi-
Pension benefit to an adequate social public organizations came to be dominated
minimum) faded (Ferrera 1993, 262). by supporters of the governing parties,
Failure to implement existing tax public sector pension benefits took on
laws further eroded the Left’s support for special cachet with politicians associated
universalism. The reluctance of successive with these parties. Public sector employees
administrations to execute the tax laws were the recipients of the largest volume of
continued even after the definitive defeat of pension legislation during the period 1948-
proposals to establish a universal pension 1983, and attention to this sector came
system. Evasion of pension contributions predominantly from DC and PSI lawmakers.
for employees continued to be an important Provisions tailor-made for small
issue from the late 1970s onward. Both the segments of the electorate are visible and
tax laws (the failure to adequately tax key valuable to the beneficiaries, and hence to
clienteles of the DC) and their their benefactors. But as the fragmentation
implementation (the failure to enforce those of the Italian welfare state increased, the
laws that were in place) sprang from the very complexity and opacity of what Italian
particularistic mode of political competition commentators have come to call "micro-
pursued by politicians of Italy’s leading corporatism" comes to protect the politicians
political parties during the post-war period. who engage in it. A thicket of highly
This altered the Italian Left’s preferences specialized provisions makes it difficult for
with regard to universalization, and made the public (and sometimes even for policy-
reform of the pension system along more makers) to know when changes have
universalistic lines nearly impossible for a occurred, and even harder for them to
period of almost 30 years. understand what the consequences of such
If particularistic political practices changes might be for the public interest.
prevented the implementation of a tax For all of these reasons, politicians who
system capable of sustaining a political compete using patronage have been loath to
coalition for universal pensions, clientelism see occupational fragmentation overturned,
also had more direct effects on the pension or even reformed.
system. Clientelism encouraged DC As we have noted, in principle the
politicians to maintain and even extend the Italian Left supported a universalistic
17pension scheme. But in a context of expenditures beginning in the 1970s. The
particularistic behavior by the ruling DC, fragmentation of Italy’s welfare state, then,
unions had a strong incentive to maintain is best understood as a byproduct of the
the pre-existing occupational funds, over original choice for occupationalism taken
which they had some modicum of control, during the Liberal period, reinforced by the
rather than giving everything over to a DC’s clientelism during the post-War period
central, DC-run universal scheme (Ferrera and the Left’s response to it.
1993). Even after 1969, when they had
more control over pension legislation, Post-War policy drift and the creation of
unions opposed moves to universalize the a familialist welfare state
pension system in part because they feared
that a state-run system would bring their As we have seen, the DC's clientelism made
constituencies into the clientelist orbit of the Italy’s fragmented occupational pension
DC, as had happened earlier with system highly resistant to reform, even once
agricultural employees (Regini and it became clear that pension expenditures
Regonini 1981, 127). Instead, they followed were far exceeding available resources and
a strategy of attempting to upgrade benefits crowing out other forms of social spending.
for their constituencies to the level enjoyed In recent years, this phenomenon has
by public sector employees (Baccaro, 1999). provoked anxieties about intergenerational
Ferrera notes that the major pension reform equity and population decline, in addition to
in 1969, which granted many benefits to the usual concerns over fiscal sustainability
industrial workers that matched those (see for example Commissione Onofri 1997,
already enjoyed by public sector employees, Rossi 1997).
marked "the enlargement of the spoils These pathologies of the Italian
system to include the PCI and unions, welfare state are well-known, and usefully
opening the way to that ‘assistential grand summarized by Esping-Andersen (1996).
coalition’ responsible for the profound The pension-heavy mix of welfare spending
imbalances that characterized the Italian has important effects on the structure of
welfare state in the years to come” (1993, Italian families. Weak active labor market
267). policies and the lack of unemployment
The persistence of a fragmented, benefits for first-time job-seekers force
occupationalist social insurance system is many young adults to delay independent
attributable in the first instance to the family formation and remain in the
particularistic mode of competition engaged households of their fathers and mothers. A
in by the DC and the PSI, whose politicians paucity of publicly provided care services
derived personal benefit from such a also discourages female labor force
fragmented system of pension provision participation, since adult women are often
even when it was clear that this system was called upon to provide care for pre-school
bankrupting the public coffers and making it and school-aged children, as well as elderly
difficult to finance other needed social parents and parents-in-law. These lacunae
goods. But the strategy of the opposition in Italian social policy are acceptable to
parties and of labor unions has also been voters in large part because a generous
conditioned by this mode of competition pension system keeps resources flowing into
among the dominant parties, and thus the the hands of older men, who then
Left ultimately shares responsibility for the redistribute the resources that subsidize the
continued expansion of the pension sector (labor market) inactivity of their wives and
along occupational lines. grown children (Jurado and Naldini 1996).
Social Catholicism as an ideology is Subsidiarity doctrine could not have
perhaps the force least plausibly responsible
for the fragmented occupational system that
has generated such high pension
18invented a better way to preserve traditional clientelist politicians. In this sense, the
patterns of authority.4 familialism of the Italian welfare state is
Ironically, though, subsidiarity Christian democratic in origin. But this
doctrine was not the motivating force behind familialism is not a result of social
the Italian welfare state's pension-heavy Catholicism implemented by a Christian
policy mix. Elderly-oriented welfare states democratic party. Indeed, the secularization
like those in Italy are better interpreted as of Italian society over time suggests that the
the product of early institutional choices impact on social policy of societal
about program design, and the competitive Catholicism should be visible in Italian
strategies of politicians (Lynch 2006). social policy earlier, rather than later. It is
Over the course of the twentieth century, relevant to note that other apparently
fast-growing occupational social insurance familialist aspects of the Italian welfare state
programs and minimal state activity in are also of rather recent vintage. Both
social assistance have come to encourage a means-tests that take into account the
pension-heavy spending mix. As we have financial resources of extended families and
seen, clientelist politics then reinforce obligations to provide care services for non-
occupational social programs, keeping them nuclear family have been implemented only
in place for long enough to produce their recently, as policy makers searched for
distinctive effects on the age-orientation of savings in social programs already squeezed
social spending. Taken together, these two to the limits by growing pension
steps imply that the familialism and male- expenditures (Saraceno 1994, Addis 1998).
breadwinner orientation of the Italian
welfare state is in large part a result of Conclusion
unchecked policy drift. That is,
occupational social programs put into place To conclude, I find little evidence that
during the Liberal period result, in the late Christian democracy has determined the
twentieth century, in a pension-heavy policy shape of the Italian welfare state through the
mix that was not the intention of the welfare mechanism of parties that carry and enforce
state’s founders. The clientelist practices of a particular set of socio-religious doctrines.
the DC are a crucial ingredient of this policy The fragmented occupational nature of the
drift, because, as we have seen, they lock public pension system is not an outgrowth
occupationalist policy institutions into place of organicist social Catholic doctrines.
despite important changes in social Rather, it results from the DC's clientelist
structures and labor markets.5 extension of an occupational pension
Clientelism has served as a powerful system, established based on étatist
brake on the development of citizenship- principles. Neither can the familialism of a
based alternatives to the basic occupational welfare state that is dominated by pension
structure set in place in the Liberal period. spending, squeezes cash benefits for
High pension spending is a result of families, and provides little in the way of
clientelist politicians’ use of the fragmented social services, be attributed to Catholic
occupationalist system; and the preservation subsidiarity doctrine. Instead, we need to
of that system is in turn due to the benefits – look to long-term processes of welfare state
divisibility, opacity -- that it provides to change and non-change to explain why the
Italian welfare state directs most of its
resources to older male family heads.
4
Ultimately, however, to the extent that these Both the origins of the Italian
policies also may have contributed to delayed welfare state and the persistence of
marriage and declining fertility, they may also particular institutional forms that appear to
paradoxically undermine “traditional” family conform with social Catholic doctrines are
structures. better explained by the behavior than by the
5
Hacker (2005) describes similar processes of
policy drift in the American welfare state.
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Christian democratic) political actors. European Social Policy. In Welfare States in
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